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  One consequence of the trade and technology driven increases in skill premia in the 
older industrial regions since the 1980s has been a perceived “skill shortage” in those regions, 
along with freer migration of skilled and professional workers from developing regions.  
While skilled migration flows remain too small to have large short-run effects on labour 
markets, a further opening to skilled migrants by the industrialised North could see substantial 
changes in labour markets and overall growth performance.  The links between demographic 
change, migration flows and economic growth are here explored using a new demographic 
sub-model that is integrated with an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global economic model 
in which regional households are disaggregated by age and gender.  Skilled migration flows 
are assumed to be motivated by real wage differences to an extent that is variably constrained 
by immigration policies.  A uniform relaxation of these constraints has most effect on labour 
markets in the traditional migrant destinations, Australia, Western Europe and North America, 
where it restrains the skill premium and substantially enhances GDP growth.  Skill premia are 
raised, however, in regions of origin, and particularly in South Asia, although the extent of 





  Rising skill premia in industrial labour markets in the 1980s and 90s sparked a 
substantial literature on the effects of expanded trade with developing regions and the 
development and transmission of skill-using technological change.
1  This literature offers 
clear evidence that skill demand has tended to outpace skill acquisition in these markets and 
that this is the primary cause of widening skill premia.
2  At the same time, the older 
industrialised regions have experienced declining fertility and, in Europe and Japan in 
particular, transitions to labour force decline.
3  These trends have been enhanced by the 
extraordinary duration of the most recent period of sustained global economic expansion, the 
ageing of industrialised populations and the associated rise in demand for service skills and, 
for some regions, by the loss of skilled workers through emigration.
4  Taken together, they 
have brought forth “skill shortages” in the older industrialised regions, along with policy 
                                                 
1 See McDougall and Tyers (1997), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Tyers et al. (1999). 
2 Indeed, at least in the United States, this trend appears to have accelerated since 2000.  Jobs requiring 
sophisticated skill appear to have grown three times as fast as total employment there.  These jobs now make up 
40 per cent of the US labour market and 70 per cent of the jobs created since 1998 (Economist, 2006a). 
3 See Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000), McDonald and Kippen (2001), Lee (2003). 
4 The many reasons for skilled migration have received widespread attention in the migration literature.  See, for 
example, Salt (1992, 1997) and Khoo et al. (2006).  They are complicated by comparatively rapid fertility 
declines amongst educated families, from whence emerge the children with the greatest potential for skill-
acquisition.  Evidence for this is offered by d’Addio and d’Ercole (2005).   3
changes that have begun to allow freer migration of skilled and professional workers from 
developing regions.
5 
While skilled migration flows remain too small to have large short-run effects on 
destination labour markets, a continued opening to skilled migrants by the industrialised 
North could see substantial changes in global labour markets and overall growth 
performance.
6  In this paper the links between demographic change, migration flows and 
growth performance are explored using a new demographic sub-model that is integrated with 
an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic model of the global economy, in which regional 
households are disaggregated by age and gender.  Skilled migration flows are assumed to be 
motivated by real wage differences to an extent that is variably constrained by immigration 
policies.  Our simulations indicate that a uniform relaxation of these constraints has most 
effect on labour markets in the traditional migrant destinations, Australia, Western Europe 
and North America, where it restrains the skill premium and substantially enhances GDP 
growth.  The skill premium is raised, however, in regions of origin, and particularly in South 
Asia, although the extent of this is shown to depend sensitively on the responsiveness of skill 
acquisition to regional skill premia. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses the construction of the matrices 
of inter-regional migration flows that are essential to the modelling.  Wage divergences that 
motivate migrants are then discussed in Section 3 and the full demographic and economic 
models used are described in Section 4.  Next, the preparation of a base line projection for the 
global economy that incorporates full demographic change is discussed in Section 5.  This 
projection is compared in Section 6 with others that allow more responsiveness to real wage 
divergences.  Conclusions are then offered in Section 7. 
 
2. Constructing the Initial Global Migration Flow Matrix 
  Migration records are incomplete and inconsistent across countries and this has 
frustrated past attempts to construct complete matrices of international movements.  Important 
                                                 
5 In Australia, skilled work visas have been made easier to obtain and applications for permanent residency by 
workers who enter on these visas, or who complete training in Australia, no longer require return to their home 
countries.  See Productivity Commission (2006).  Similar changes have occurred in the European Union, where 
the emphasis has been on “temporary” immigration of skilled workers.  Of course, following the expansion of 
the Union to 25, internal migration from poorer to the four richer countries that have permitted it has also been 
very significant.  For a discussion of these changes, see Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2004: 37-60) 
and The Economist (2006b). 
6 Labour market effects in destination regions are the focus of Borjas (2003).  Of course, the loss of skilled 
workers in regions of origin may be more significant, though the “brain drain” literature is divided on this.  See 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Carrington and Detragiache (1998), Benie et al. (2001), Adams (2003), 
Commander et al. (2003), Faini (2003) and Schiff (2006).  This paper addresses the brain drain issue only 
indirectly.   4
progress is being made by Parsons et al. (2005), who present migrant stocks for 226 countries 
of both origin and destination.  They rely primarily on census data, so that countries of origin 
are determined for the foreign born as countries of birth.  These data are complemented by 
those on nationality, which is treated analogously to citizenship.  By defining migrants as 
“people who change their country of usual residence”, they emphasise permanent movements. 
 
Migration Statistics 
  In addition to the national census, Parsons et al. rely on associated labour force 
surveys, which typically include questions about the nationality and place of birth of the 
respondents.  The measurement of migrant populations based on census information 
facilitates greater comparability of statistics across countries because of the limited scope of 
the questions asked.  Drawbacks are that censuses are infrequently conducted, with “rounds” 
that usually span a decade, and each country carries out its survey at different times.  Also 
there is a tendency to under-represent migrants who may not be registered for census 
purposes.  These data are further complemented by population registers, which are accounts 
of the domestic and foreign population within a country.  They are generally maintained via a 
legal obligation for all persons to register themselves with the appropriate local authorities.  
Registers provide information more frequently than censuses but, since not all departures are 
recorded, outflow data are less reliable and there are differences in the classification of 
migrants that complicate comparisons between countries.  In general, immigrant stock 
statistics require cautious interpretation, since they contain a high degree of cross-country 
heterogeneity from unavoidable inaccuracies associated with both individual countries’ 
census and survey data gathering practices and the approaches used in identifying both legal 
and illegal immigrants. 
 
The Migration Flow Matrix 
  We begin by constructing an accessible disaggregation of the world into 14 regions 
(Table 1).  The first step in generating annual migration flows is to consolidate the matrix of 
stocks developed by Parsons et al. (2005).  Annual flows of migrants to Australia, North 
America and Western Europe from the 14 regions in 1997 were obtained from Chan and 
Tyers (2006) with some adjustments to the Australian data based on Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001).  Because these regions maintain and publish 
comparatively complete and accurate immigration records we used them to investigate the 
relationship between migration flows and stocks.  The ratio of migrant flows to stocks was   5
first calculated, as shown in Table 2, from which it can be seen that the ratios vary 
significantly across the destinations for each source region, yet the average ratio of 
immigration flows to stocks (the column ratios) are comparatively robust across the 
destination regions.  As flow data for the remaining 11 regions is not readily or reliably 
available the average ratios for each region of origin were applied to the stock matrix to 
produce the resulting matrix of migration flows, presented in Table 3 and summarised in 
Figure 1.
7 
  Our approximations suggest that the largest source of gross emigrants was “Central 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union” whose former residents tended to settle in Western 
Europe.  The next largest source of gross emigrants was the “Rest of the World” grouping, 
which includes New Zealand, the former Yugoslavia and the Central American countries 
other than Mexico.
8  The Central Europe and Former Soviet Union bloc was also the third 
most popular destination for migrants, following Western Europe and North America 
respectively, with 22 per cent of the Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union immigrant 
intake coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  Australia has the largest volume of immigrants by comparison with its population.  
The majority of these appear to come from the “Rest of the World” bloc, though Western 
Europeans account for 20 per cent of Australian annual immigration with Chinese and Other 
East Asians each providing roughly 10 per cent.  On the other hand, 59 per cent of Australian 
emigration flows are to North America and Western Europe, with 13 per cent going to Central 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union and eight per cent to Asia. 
  The regions with net annual immigration, as shown in Figure 1, are Western Europe, 
North America, Australia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Japan, in descending order 
of volume.  All the remaining regions have net annual emigration rates with the Rest of the 
World providing the largest source of migrants and Indonesia the least. 
 
Migration Flows by Age and Gender 
  Detailed accounts of both the regional and the age-gender compositions of immigrant 
flows are unavailable for most countries and regions.  A comprehensive breakdown is 
available for the United States, however, via the US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
                                                 
7 Since immigration to developing region is likely to differ qualitatively from that into industrial regions, this 
assumption is likely to cause bias.  There is as yet no clear evidence as to the direction of this bias, however. 
8 Because the GTAP economic database offers a restricted list of regional aggregations, as shown in Table 1 the 
former Yugoslavia is allocated to the rest of the world group, as are the countries of Central America (excluding 
Mexico).  During the 1990s these were key sources of immigrants to Western Europe and North America, 
respectively, which is why this region also appears to have offered the largest volume of net emigrants.   6
(USCIS, 2001)
9.  It is therefore assumed that the age-gender composition of all migrant flows 
matches that of immigrants to the United States.  By firstly summing the total US immigrant 
population of each group for the years 1986 to 2001, the migrant population share of each 
group was derived.  These shares were then applied to the aggregate flow matrix of Table 3 to 
derive a set of eight matrices that detail the migrant flows between regions for each age-
gender group.  Thus the annual migration flow rate for age group a, gender g, from the region 
































agrd M  is the annual migration flow rate between r and d expressed as a proportion of 
the destination region d’s group population,  ,, agd N .  The variable  , rd M  represents the total 
flow of migrants from r to d in Table 3 and  ,, a g d NthAmerica M =  is the age and gender specific flow 
of immigrants to North America. 
  Our analysis divides production (unskilled) workers from professional (skilled 
workers).
 10  Indeed, all age-gender groups are stratified in this way so as to represent 
socioeconomic division.
11  To thus subdivide the matrices of migration flows we make the 
strong assumption that the matrix of age-gender specific migration rates,  ,,,
R
agrd M , is the same 
for production worker and professional migrant worker flows.  Statistical evidence is 
accumulating that indicates the contrary (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006), yet the available data 
remain insufficient to form a reliable separation between the two complete matrices of 
migration rates. 
 
3. The Incentive to Migrate - Regional Real Wage Differences 
  If we assume that the average quality of workers in each occupational group 
(production and professional workers) is the same across regions, then inter-regional real 
wage inequality must stem from differences in relative factor abundance and technology, 
combined with trade and migration restrictions (Tokarik, 2002).  Trade liberalisation and 
                                                 
9 Thanks are due to Professor Tim Hatton of the Australian National University for directing the authors to these 
data. 
10 Professional, or “Skilled” occupations include managers, professionals, engineers, scientists, teachers and 
bureaucrats, to list a few (Hertel, 1997).  Production, or unskilled workers are defined to include tradespersons, 
clerks, sales assistants, industrial workers and farm hands (Liu et al, 1998). 
11 The stratification even applies to children, on the grounds that the offspring of skilled parents are very likely to 
attain skill levels at least as advanced as their parents.   7
skill-biased technical change have accelerated the growth in demand for professional relative 
to production labour in developed countries.  This has tended to expand the wedge between 
the real wage rates of skilled and unskilled workforces, or to raise the “skill premium”.  
Conversely, the associated realisation of developing regions’ comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive products has tended to raise production wage rates.  In these regions, the pure 
trade effect has therefore been to reduce the skill premium, yet they, too, have encountered 
skill-biased technical change and so the net effect on skill premia in developing regions has 
depended on the relative magnitudes of these two effects (Suryahadi et al. 2001). 
Wage inequality can also be related to international migration (Kar and Beladi, 2002).  
Most migration, as indicated in the previous section, is from less developed regions to the 
OECD countries.  Depending on the skill-composition of the migration flows, they can be 
expected to reduce real production and professional wages in the destination regions while 
raising them in the regions of origin.  It is our objective to estimate these effects using a 
global simulation model.  To facilitate this, however, it is necessary to assemble a starting 
distribution of real wages across regions by skill level.  The key resource for this analysis is 
the GTAP global database.  In it, production (unskilled) and professional (skilled) labour are 
defined based on ILO occupational categories (Liu et al. 1998).  The database offers total 
payments to each type of labour in each region for the base year, 1997.  No adjustment is 
made in the database for purchasing power parity (PPP). 
 
Market Exchange Rate Wages 
  The GTAP Database provides total payments to each of the two types of labour, 
denominated in US dollars at market exchange rates (MER).  It does not offer volume 
statistics for primary factor inputs other than physical capital, however.  Estimates are 
therefore required of total full time equivalent labour forces by skill level in each region.  
Labour force numbers by age and gender were obtained from Chan and Tyers (2006) for the 
year 1997.  Labour force shares of skilled workers were then obtained from Liu et al. for each 
GTAP-defined region, and then aggregated to the 14 applied here. 
Wage rates in region r for skill level s, used for the purpose of this analysis were 
firms’ purchases at agents’ prices, EVFAs,r, which had been calculated as expenditure on 
labour by firms across all sectors.  Thus the 1997 US$ annual wage per worker, w, in region r 
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where for age a and gender g  r g a L , ,  is the size of the full time equivalent labour force and 
,, agr S  is the volume share of skilled labour.  The resulting rates are listed in Table 4 and 
plotted in Figure 2. 
  These results indicate that the US$ rewards to workers in 1997 were highest in the 
industrialised regions while developing regions, typically with higher population densities and 
poorer technologies, have lower wages for both skilled and unskilled workers.  There are also 
significant wage differences between the skill levels for all regions with professional workers 
earning consistently more than production workers
12.  The lowest wage rate for production 
workers was in the Indian and Other South Asian regions, with workers earning roughly 
US$350 per year, while Japan offered its production workers the largest unskilled reward at a 
rate of US$32,449 per year.  North America and Japan payed professional workers the highest 
wage at more than US$43,000 per year whereas India offered its professional workers the 
lowest compensation at an average wage of approximately US$650 per year. 
  It is notable that the coefficient of inter-regional variation in average production wages 
is larger than the corresponding coefficient for professional wages (Table 4).  One hypothesis 
to explain this is that the global markets for professional workers are more integrated via 
skilled migration than are those for unskilled workers. 
  The implicit assumption behind the assembly of the GTAP global database is that the 
purchasing power of one US$ is equal in all regions.  For most applications, departures from 
this assumption do little harm.  In considering migration inducement, however, the fact that 
the prices of non-tradables in developing countries are lower than in industrial countries 
implies that the purchasing power of a US$ is higher in the developing countries.  Since 
inducement to migrate depends at least in part on the real purchasing power of wages in 
destination and origin regions, errors in MER-based projections of real wages tend to cause 
overestimation of the migration response.  Purchasing power parity (PPP) wages would more 
reliably reflect the true distribution because they would incorporate, at least partly, a more 
realistic valuation of non-traded goods and services. 
 
                                                 
12 This is with the exception of Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union which appears to have had slightly 
larger returns to production labour.  This is very likely a statistical aberration due to inaccurate national accounts 
data on labour payments.   9
PPP-adjusted wages 
In order to compare the real purchasing power of wages across regions, the market 
exchange rate results in Table 4 were converted to PPP using a multiplier derived the Global 
Development Network Database (World Bank, 2000).  This multiplier is the ratio of the 
MER-based GDP estimate in US$ to the corresponding PPP estimate, by country in 1997
13.  
This was used to calculate the PPP multiplier for that year, 
PM
r α , for the 14 defined regions, 
by aggregating individual countries according to MER-based GDP shares.  The PPP wage 
estimates are therefore: 
(3)  ,,
PPP MER PM




















i GDP  and 
MER
i GDP  represent, respectively, the GDP corresponding to purchasing 
power parity and market exchange rate values in country i. 
PPP wage results are also listed Table 4.  They indicate a smaller wage range across 
regions for both skilled and unskilled workers when compared with MER values.  The 
coefficient of variation of production wages per worker decreased from the MER ratio of 1.32 
to 0.97.  Similarly, the PPP professional wage rate also had a reduced coefficient of variation, 
down from the MER value of 1.11 to 0.80.  Average regional PPP-adjusted wages were larger 
by approximately US$619 for production workers and US$3,478 for professional workers.  In 
developing regions, average PPP-adjusted wages doubled for production workers and more 
than doubled for professional workers.  These revised wage divergences notwithstanding, no 
significant changes in the regional rankings of wages are suggested and so the implications of 
PPP adjustment would not appear to affect preferred migration directions.
14  For the present at 
least, our subsequent analysis is therefore based on MER-based real wage divergences. 
 
4. Modelling Global Economic and Demographic Change 
  The approach adopted follows Tyers et al. (2005), in that it applies a complete 
demographic sub-model that is integrated within a dynamic numerical model of the global 
economy.  The economic model is a development of GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of 
                                                 
13 Thanks are due to Prof. Steve Dowrick of the Australian National University for directing the authors to these 
data. 
14 One anomaly concerns the professional wage in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is very high PPP-adjusted.  While 
it is possible that the comparatively small number of professionals in this region do have extraordinarily high 
real incomes, it is likely that the large value is inflated by undercounting.  Moreover, other lifestyle 
considerations suggest it is unlikely that such high real wages would motivate skilled migration into the region.   10
which has single households in each region and therefore no demographic structure.
15  The 




The demographic sub-model tracks populations in four age groups and two genders: a 
total of 8 population groups in each of 14 regions.
16  The four age groups are the dependent 
young, adults of fertile and working age, older working adults and the mostly-retired over 
60s.  The resulting age-gender structure is displayed in Figure 3.  The population is further 
divided between households that provide production labour and those providing professional 
labour.
17  Each age-gender-skill group is a homogeneous sub-population with group-specific 
birth and death rates and rates of both immigration and emigration.
18  If the group spans T 
years, the survival rate to the next age group is the fraction 1/T of its population, after group-
specific deaths have been removed and its population has been adjusted for net migration. 
The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life expectancy at 60, which 
varies across genders and regions.  The key demographic parameters, then, are birth rates, sex 
ratios at birth, age and gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates and life 
expectancies at 60.
19  Immigration rates are a particular focus here and these are responsive to 
inter-regional real wage comparisons, constrained in a manner designed to represent the 
impacts of immigration policy.  A further key parameter is the rate at which each region’s 
education and social development structure transforms production worker families into 
professional worker families.  Each year a particular proportion of the population in each 
production worker age-gender group is transferred to professional status.  These proportions 
have an exogenous component that is set depending on the regions’ levels of development, the 
associated capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of the production and 
professional labour groups.  They are also responsive to regional skilled wage premia, to an 
                                                 
15 The GTAP-Dynamic model is a development of its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel et al. 1997).  
Its dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000).  The adaptation of the model to incorporate 
the demographic sub-model is detailed in Tyers and Shi (forthcoming a). 
16 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in dependency 
ratios.  For a more complete documentation of the sub-model, see Chan and Tyers (2006). 
17 The subdivision between production and professional labour accords with the ILO’s occupation-based 
classification and is consistent with the labour division adopted in the GTAP Database.  See Liu et al. (1998). 
18 Mothers in families providing production labour are assumed to produce children that will grow up to also 
provide production labour, while the children of mothers in professional families are correspondingly assumed to 
become professional workers. 
19 Immigration and emigration are also age and gender specific.  The model represents a full matrix of global 
migration flows for each age and gender group.  Each of these flows is currently set at a constant proportion of 
the population of its destination group.  See Chan and Tyers (2006) and Vedi (2005) for further details.   11
extent that is readily adjusted to reflect changes in the capacities of education and training 
systems. 
  In any year, for each age group, a, gender group g, skill group s, region of origin, r 
and region of destination, d, the volume of migration flow is: 
(4)  ,,,, ,,,, ,,,,, , ,
tt R t
agsrd d agsrd agsd M MN a g r d δ =∀  , 
where 
t
d δ  is a destination-specific factor reflecting immigration policy in region d, set to unity 
in all but counterfactual experiments, 
R
agsrd M is the migration rate between r and d expressed 
as a proportion of the group population in region d,  agsd N .  The migration rate is then 
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⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
, 
where  , s r W  and  , s d W  are wage rates by skill level in regions of origin and destination 
(measured relative to a common global numeraire), 
C
r P  and 
C
d P  are consumer price levels in 
the two regions (measured relative to the same global numeraire) and  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is an elasticity 
of response that reflects the extent to which immigration policies constrain the bilateral flow 
between r and d. 
  Given the migration matrix, agsrd M , the population in each age, gender and skill group 
and region can be constructed.  We begin with the population of males aged 0-14 from 
professional families in region d (a=014, g=m, s=sk, r=d). 
(6) 
11
014, , , 014, , , , 1539, , ,
1
014, , , 014, , , 014, , , , 014, , , ,
11 1
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d S  is the sex ratio at birth (the ratio of male to female births) in region d,  ,
t
s d B  is the 
birth rate for women of skill level sk,  014, ,
t
md D the death rate and  d ρ  is the rate at which region 
d’s educational institutions and general development transform production into professional 
worker families.  The final term is survival to the corresponding 15-39 age group.  In the 
corresponding equation for young males from production worker families the penultimate 
term is negative and the subscript sk is replaced with unsk in all but that penultimate term. 
For females in professional families in this age group the corresponding equation is:   12
(7) 
11
014, , , 014, , , , 1539, , ,
1
014, , , 014, , , 014, , , , 014, , , ,
11 1
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For adults of gender g from professional families in the age group 15-39 the equation includes 
a survival term from the younger age group.  It is: 
(8) 
11 1
1539, , , 1539, , , 014, , , 014, , , 014, , ,
1
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11
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where the second term is the surviving inflow from the 0-14 age group and the final term is 
the surviving outflow to the 40-59 age group.  Again, the skill transformation term is negative 
in the case of the corresponding equation for production worker families.  The population of 
professional adults of gender g, in age group 40-59 follows as: 
(9) 
11 1
4059, , , 4059, , , 1539, , , 1539, , , 1539, , ,
1
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11
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For adults in the 60+ age group, the corresponding relationship is: 
(10) 
11 1
60 , , , 60 , , , 4059, , , 4059, , , 4059, , ,
6 0,, ,, 6 0,, ,,
11
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where the final term indicates that deaths from this group each year depend on its life 
expectancy at 60,  60 , , ,
t
g sk d L + .  Again, the equation for aged production worker family members 
is the same except that the skill transformation term is negative. 
 Finally,  d ρ , the rate at which region d’s educational institutions and general 
development transform production into professional worker households depends on the level 
































.   13
TW
d ε  is the elasticity of the transformation rate to the skilled-unskilled wage ratio.  This 
elasticity is thought to be larger the more developed the region.  To represent this, it is set to 
grow with real per capita GNP according to elasticity
TY
d ε . 
 
Sources and structure: 
  Key parameters in the model are the migration rates,  ,,,,
R
agsrd M , birth rates,  ,
t
s r B , sex 
ratios at birth, 
t
r S , death rates,  ,,,
t
agsr D , life expectancies at 60,  60 , , ,
t
g sr L +  and the skill 
transformation rates  d ρ .  The migration rates are based on the flows analysed in Section 2.  
In the base line projection they are held constant through time – the elasticity  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is made 
negligibly small.  The skill transformation rates are based on changes in the composition of 
aggregate regional labour forces as between production and professional workers during the 
decade prior to the base year, 1997, and on the human capital projections by Goujon and Lutz 
(2004).  The resulting transformation rates are then refined so that, when they are held 
constant through 2030, the skill premia in all regions remain stable.  This then yields the base 
line projection.  To maintain the base line constant transformation rates, the elasticities 
TW
d ε  
and 
TY
d ε  are made negligibly small.
20 
 
Asymptotic trends in other parameters: 
  The birth rates, life expectancy at 60 and the age specific mortality rates all trend 
through time asymptotically.  For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target 
rate is identified.
21  The parameters then approach these target rates with initial growth rates 
determined by historical observation.  In year t the birth rate of region r is: 
(12)  () ( )
000 1
tt
rr T g t r B BBB e
β =+ − −  , 
where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the historical growth rate: 


























                                                 
20 Note that, as regions become more advanced and populations in the production worker families become 
comparatively small, constant skill transformation rates have diminishing effects on professional populations. 
21 In this discussion the skill index, s, is omitted because birth and death rates, and life expectancies at 60 do not 
vary by skill category in the version of the model used.   14
 
Labour force projections: 
To evaluate the number of “full-time equivalent” workers we first construct labour 
force participation rates, Pa,g,r by gender and age group for each region from ILO statistics on 
the “economically active population”.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are 
part time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work.  The 
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ar µ  is a shift parameter reflecting the influence of policy on participation rates.  The 
time superscript on  ,,
t
agr P  refers to the extrapolation of observed trends in these parameters.
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Asymptotic trends in labour force participation: 
For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target country is identified 
whose participation rate is approached asymptotically.  The rate of this approach is 
determined by the initial rate of change.  Thus, the participation rate takes the form: 
(16)  ( )( )
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where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the initial participation growth rate: 
(17)  () ( )
00 10
,, ,, ,, 0
,, 00
,, ,,
























Target rates are chosen from countries considered “advanced” in terms of trends in 
participation rates.  Where female participation rates are rising, therefore, Norway provides a 




Accounting for part time work: 
  For each age group, a, gender, g, and region, r, full-time equivalency depends on the 
fraction of participants working full time, fa,g,r, and, for those working part time, the ratio of 
                                                 
22 Although part time hours may well also be trending through time, we hold F constant in the current version of 
the model. 
23 The resulting participation rates are listed by Chan and Tyers (2006: Table 10).   15
average part time hours to full time hours for that gender group and region, rg,r.  For each 
group, the ratio of full time equivalent workers to total labour force participants is then 
(19)  ( ) ,, ,, ,, , 1 agr agr agr gr Ff f r =+ − .
24 
 
The aged dependency ratio: 
We define and calculate four dependency ratios: 1) a youth dependency ratio is the 
number of children per full time equivalent worker, 2) an aged dependency ratio is the 
number of persons over 60 per full time equivalent worker, 3) a non-working aged 
dependency ratio is the number of non-working persons over 60 per full time equivalent 
worker, and 4) a more general dependency ratio is defined that takes as its numerator the total 
non-working population, including children.
25  That used here is the one of most widespread 
policy interest, the non-working aged dependency ratio: 
(20) 
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4.2 The Global Economic Model 
GTAP-Dynamic is a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world 
economy.  It is a microeconomic model, in that assets and money are not represented and 
prices are set relative to a global numeraire.  In the version used, the world is subdivided into 
14 regions.  Industries are aggregated into just three sectors, food (including processed foods), 
industry (mining and manufacturing) and services.  To reflect composition differences 
between regions, these products are differentiated by region of origin, meaning that the “food” 
produced in one region is not the same as that produced in others.  Consumers substitute 
imperfectly between foods from different regions. 
As in most other dynamic models of the global economy, in GTAP-Dynamic the 
endogenous component of simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  
Technical change is introduced in the form of exogenous trends and skill (or human capital) 
acquisition is driven by the constant transformation rates introduced in the previous section.  
A consequence of this is that, at least for the world as a whole, the model exhibits the property 
                                                 
24 Preliminary estimates of fa,g,r and rg,r are approximated from OECD (1999: Table 1.A.4) and OECD (2002: 
Statistical Annex, Table F).  No data has yet been sought on part time work in non-OECD member countries.  In 
these cases the diversity of OECD estimates is used to draw parallels between countries and regions and thus to 
make educated guesses.  The results are listed by Chan and Tyers (2006: Tables 11 and 12).   
25 All these dependency ratios are defined in detail by Chan and Tyers (2006).   16
that an increase in the growth rate of the population raises the growth rate of real GDP but 
reduces the level of real per capita income.  This result is common to all such models where 
there are diminishing returns to capital and labour, the simplest of these models being that of 
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), the effects of population growth in which are detailed by 
Pitchford (1974: Ch.4).  What distinguishes the model from these simpler progenitors is its 
recursive multi-regional dynamics.  Investors have adaptive expectations about the real net 
rates of return on installed capital in each region.  These drive the distribution of investment 
across regions.  In each, the level of investment is determined by a comparison of net rates of 
return with borrowing rates yielded by a global trust to which each region’s saving 
contributes. 
To capture the full effects of demographic change, including those of ageing, the standard 
model has been modified to include multiple age, gender and skill groups in line with the 
structure of the demographic sub-model.  In the complete model, these 16 groups differ in 
their consumption preferences, saving rates and their labour supply behaviour.  Unlike the 
standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private consumption, 
government consumption and total saving via an upper level Cobb-Douglas utility function 
that implies fixed regional saving rates, this adaptation first divides regional incomes between 
government consumption and total private disposable income.  The implicit assumption is that 
governments balance their budgets while private groups save or borrow. 
In splitting each region’s private disposable income between the eight age-gender groups, 
the approach is to construct a weighted subdivision that draws on empirical studies of the 
distribution of disposable income between age-gender groups for “typical” advanced and 
developing countries.
26  Individuals in each age-gender group then split their disposable 
incomes between consumption and saving.  For this a reduced form approach is taken to the 
intertemporal optimisation problem faced by each.  It employs an exponential consumption 
equation that links group real per capita consumption expenditure to real per capita disposable 
income and the real interest rate.  This equation is calibrated for each group and region based 
on a set of initial (1997) age-specific saving rates from per capita disposable income.
27  
Importantly, these show transitions to negative saving with retirement in the older industrial 
regions.  This gives rise to declines in average saving rates as population’s age.  The empirical 
studies on age-specific saving behaviour are less clear, however, when it comes to developing 
regions.  In the important case of China, for example, only modest declines in saving rates are 
                                                 
26 The analytics of income splitting are described in detail by Tyers et al. (2005). 
27 For further details, see Tyers et al. (2005).   17
recorded when people retire.  This is partly due to complications associated with China’s 
transformation from state to private employment and, of wider relevance to developing 
countries, the comparatively large proportion of elderly consumption spending that is 
financed from the income of younger family members (Feng and Mason 2005). 
 
5. Constructing the Base Line Scenario 
The base line scenario represents a “business as usual” projection of the global economy 
through 2030.  Although policy analysis can be sensitive to the content of this scenario, the 
focus of this paper is on the extent of departures from it that would be caused by alternative 
levels of responsiveness of migration flows to inter-regional real wage divergences.  
Nonetheless, it is instructive to describe the base line, because all scenarios examined have in 
common a set of assumptions about future trends in productivity and because some exposition 
of the base line makes the construction of departures from it clearer. 
 
Exogenous factor productivity growth 
Exogenous sources of growth enter the model as factor productivity growth shocks, 
applied separately for each of the model’s five factors of production (land, physical capital, 
natural resources, production labour and professional labour).  Simulated growth rates are 
very sensitive to productivity growth rates since, the larger these are for a particular region the 
larger is that region’s marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys higher levels 
of investment and hence a double boost to its per capita real income growth rate.  The 
importance of productivity notwithstanding, the empirical literature is inconsistent as to 
whether productivity growth has been faster in agriculture or in manufacturing and whether 
the gains in any sector have enhanced all primary factors or merely production labour.  The 
factor productivity growth rates assumed in all scenarios are drawn from a new survey of the 
relevant empirical literature (Tyers et al. 2005).  Agricultural productivity grows more rapidly 
than productivity in the other sectors in China, Indonesia, Other East Asia, India and Other 
South Asia.  This allows continued shedding of labour to the other sectors.  In the 
industrialised regions, the process of labour relocation has slowed down and labour 
productivity growth is slower in agriculture. 
 
Interest premia 
The standard GTAP-Dynamic model takes no explicit account of financial market maturity 
or investment risk and so tends to allocate investment to regions that have high marginal   18
products of physical capital.  These tend to be labour-abundant developing countries whose 
labour forces are still expanding rapidly.  Although the raw model finds these regions 
attractive prospects for this reason, we know that considerations of financial market 
segmentation, financial depth and risk limit the flow of foreign investment at present and that 
these are likely to remain important in the future.  To account for this we have constructed a 
“pre-base line” simulation in which we maintain the relative growth rates of investment across 
regions.  In this simulation, global investment rises and falls but its allocation between regions 
is thus controlled.
28  This creates wedges between the international and regional borrowing 
rates.  They show high interest premia for the populous developing regions of Indonesia, 
India, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Premia tend to fall over time in other regions, 
where labour forces are falling or growing more slowly.  Most spectacular is a secular fall in 
the Chinese premium, due to the maintenance of investment growth in China despite the 
eventual slow-down and decline in its labour force.
29  In the subsequent base line simulation, 
and in all other simulations, investment levels are again set as endogenous and the time paths 
of all interest premia are made exogenous. 
 
The base line projection 
Demographic changes in the base line projection are characterised by declining fertility 
and ageing in all regions.  The key demographic differences between regions concern their 
initial age distributions and fertility levels – the industrialised regions begin with older 
populations and lower fertility than the developing ones and so, generally, population growth 
continues to be higher in the developing regions, particularly in South Asia and Africa, as 
shown in Figure 4.  The pervasive ageing is suggested by the projected sizes and 
compositions of regional labour forces listed in Table 5 and the non-working aged 
dependency ratios in Table 6.  Economic changes in the base line are indicated in Table 7, 
which details the average GDP and real per capita income growth performance of each region 
from 1997 to 2030.  In part because of its comparatively young population and hence its 
continuing rapid labour force growth, India attracts substantial new investment and is 
projected to take over from China as the world’s most rapidly expanding region.  Rapid 
population growth detracts from India’s real per capita income performance, however.  By 
this criterion, China is the strongest performing region through the three decades.  Indonesia 
and “other East Asia” are also strong performers, while the older industrial economies 
                                                 
28 To do this the interest premium variable (GTAP Dynamic variable SDRORT) is made endogenous, only in the 
pre-base simulation. 
29 See Tyers and Golley (2006) for further details on the treatment of China.   19
continue to grow more slowly.  The African regions enjoy good GDP growth performance but 
their high population growth rates limit their performance in per capita terms. 
 
6. Increasing Responsiveness to Real Wage Divergences 
  The shocks introduced centre on the elasticities in equations (5) and (11).  Recall from 
(5) that  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is the elasticity of the migration rate for skill level s between regions r and d 
to the ratio of the destination and origin real wages.  In the base line simulation, this elasticity 
is set to negligibility, so that migration flows are driven only by the sizes of destination 
populations in each age-gender group.  That is, flows maintain base period rates of 
immigration over destination populations in each bilateral direction for each age-gender 
group.  This is intended to imply that the flows are dictated by immigration policies in 
destination regions and thus regulated on adaptation cost grounds. 
 
The high migration simulations 
The first alternative simulation, labelled M1, simply expands this elasticity, for skilled 
workers only, to a value of 0.5 in the interval 2000-2010.
30  Skilled migration volumes then 
increase by most between low and high real wage regions.  Because this additional migration 
makes skilled workers scarcer in the regions of origin, however, the skill premium rises in 
those regions.  This might be expected to induce a skill-acquisition response from production 
workers in the regions of origin.  Allowance for accelerated skill transformation takes the 
form of (10), in which 
TW
d ε is the elasticity of the transformation rate to the ratio of skilled and 
production real wages and 
TY
d ε  governs the response of 
TW
d ε to rising real per capita incomes 
and hence rising educational opportunity and is set at unity throughout.  
TW
d ε is set at 
negligibility in the base line and in M1, so that skill transformation rates are constant through 
time for each region. 
A second alternative simulation is constructed that is the same as M1 except that 
accelerated skill transformation is allowed by adjusting 
TW
d ε .  More particularly, the new 
simulation, labelled M2, has 
TW
d ε  rising to a value of 0.25 over 2000-2010.  This enlargement 
enables responses to pre-existing skill premia as well as to changes in skill premia induced by 
altered immigration policies.  Where skill premia are large at the outset, as is most notably the 
case in North America and Africa (Figure 2), skill acquisition can therefore be expected to 
                                                 
30 A value of 0.7 causes the skill premia in some destination regions to collapse unrealistically.   20
accelerate most.  The base line and M2 values of the transformation rates are listed in Table 8.  
Rates are initially small in all regions, expanding most, as expected, in North America and 
Africa. 
 
Increasing responsiveness to real wage divergences 
  Expanding migration in a manner that is responsive to real wage differences is found 
to yield “more of the same” in terms of the direction of and relative magnitudes of migration 
flows.  This is reassuring in that it suggests that real wage divergences are an explanation for 
recorded migration, immigration policies and quotas notwithstanding.  The similarity of 
pattern is clear from a comparison of the base period annual flows, indicated in Figure 1, with 
the accumulation of projected flows over the next three decades shown in Figure 5.  Except in 
the cases of two prominent regions of origin, Central Europe and the former Soviet Union and 
the “rest of the world” group, migrants tend to leave populous regions, so that their departures 
have small proportional effects.  As is clear from Figure 6, however, they do make a 
significant difference in the principal regions of destination, namely Western Europe, North 
America and Australia.
31  Of the destination regions identified, the skilled immigrant intake is 
largest relative to the population in Australia, where the additional migrants expand the 2030 
population by almost a tenth. 
  The economic effects of these migrant flows come from changes in skilled labour 
forces and, because the migrants tend to be younger than the average age in destination 
regions, these imply associated changes in non-working aged dependency ratios.  The labour 
force effects are illustrated in Figure 7 and detailed in Table 9.  The professional labour forces 
of Western Europe, North America and Australia are raised by between a tenth and a quarter, 
while those of the key regions of origin fall.  The corresponding effects on aged dependency 
are smaller, however.  Considering that migrants are younger on average than destination 
populations and that the three-decade increases in the base line destination labour forces are 
large (Table 6), the 2030 destination non-working aged dependency ratios fall by small 
amounts - a fraction of a per cent in Western Europe, a per cent or so in North America and 
nearly two per cent in Australia (Table 10).  Clearly, the age distribution effects are modest 
                                                 
31 The Middle East and North Africa is also a prominent destination region, particularly for workers from South 
and Southeast Asia, but this migration remains small in relation to the population of that region.   21
and expanded skilled migration is unlikely to be a solution to the fiscal problems associated 
with age dependency.
32 
  The expanded professional labour forces in the principal destination regions do have 
broader economic implications, however.  Although their effects on the average growth rates 
of GDP over three decades are small compared with the drivers of base line growth (Figure 
8), the economies of the destination regions are larger than their base line levels by between 
two and eight per cent in 2030 (Figure 9).  For the world as a whole, the migrations raise 2030 
global GDP by 1.6 per cent.  The assumed homogeneity of professional workers across 
regions and the market exchange rate database of the GTAP-Dynamic model, which tends to 
make labour productivity in tradeable goods sectors more similar than the actual wage data of 
Section 3 suggest, both act to reduce the estimated global GDP gains from the relocation of 
skilled workers. 
The impacts of increased migration on wages are shown in Figure 10.  They are 
straight-forward.  In M1, where there is no change in the rate of skill acquisition within 
regions, real professional wages fall in destination regions, which experience increased 
professional labour supply, and rise in regions of origin.  Production wages rise in the 
destination regions, since the rise in the supply of skill raises the marginal product of 
production labour there.  The opposite is true in regions of origin, where the skill supply falls.  
It is also evident from Figure 10 that the skill premium falls in the destination regions and 
rises in the regions of origin.  Even though the labour forces of India and “other South Asia” 
are very large by comparison with their emigrations, their skilled labour forces are reduced by 
measurable proportions (Figure 7).  This causes significant increases in their skilled wage 
rates relative to the base line projection, as shown in Figure 10 and listed in Table 11.  The 
corresponding changes in East and Southeast Asia are smaller because skilled wages are 
higher there at the outset and so proportionally smaller emigrations are induced.
33 
Finally, the net effects of all this on populations, the skill intensity of labour forces, 
the terms of trade and real per capita income are indicated in Table 12.  The migration-only 
effects on destination regions, from M1, are three-fold.  First, immigration raises the domestic 
population, slowing the growth rate of real income per capita (following the behaviour of all 
                                                 
32 This is a well-established conclusion in demography (Young, 1990) that has been re-examined following the 
rise in concern about population ageing and slower growth in Europe (United Nations 2000a).  A clearer 
demonstration of it using the method of this paper can be found in Tyers and Shi (forthcoming b). 
33 The pattern for the “Middle East and North Africa” is reversed, of course, because this region is a destination 
for migrants due to its concentrations of petroleum wealth, even though it includes many poor countries.   22
such neoclassical capital-accumulation models, as discussed in Section 4.2).
34  Second, the 
skill level of the overall labour force is increased by the immigration, which raises average 
labour productivity and real income per capita.  This at least partially offsets the population 
effect.  Third, destination regions have lower average real wages and hence lower production 
costs and export prices relative to regions of origin.  They therefore experience real 
depreciations relative to the base line, or adverse terms of trade effects.
35  These three effects 
tend to offset each other, so that the net changes in real per capita income due to expanded 
skilled migration are small. 
In Australia, because of the dominance of the population-expanding and terms of trade 
effects, real per capita income is shown to grow slower, ending up lower in 2030, though by 
only a fraction of a per cent.  In North America, the (negative) population expansion effect is 
substantially smaller, while the (positive) skill intensity and (negative) terms of trade effects 
are smaller by just over a third.  On net, then, North America is a small gainer form the 
expanded immigration.  In the case of Western Europe, all three effects are smaller still, and 
the net is a very small gain relative to the baseline.  Japan is also a small net gainer, mainly 
because of an externally induced improvement in its terms of trade.  In most source regions, 
the slower population growth due to emigration, combined with their improved terms of trade, 
dominates their loss of skill intensity, so they are small net gainers.  The exceptions are the 
South Asia regions, which suffer substantial reductions in skill intensity, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where all three effects are proportionally small but the loss of skill intensity appears to 
dominate and the “rest of the world”, which is affected similarly. 
 
Increasing both migration and skill-acquisition responsiveness 
When the additional effect of skill acquisition is added, in M2, net migration 
movement is slightly larger (Figure 5).  This is so because the skill-acquisition reduces the 
tendency for the migration to raise professional wages and skill premia in regions of origin by 
more than it lowers professional wages, and hence squeezes skill premia, in destination 
regions.  Evident from the real wage changes in Figure 10, this is due to the expansion in skill 
acquisition responding more to pre-existing skill premia than to changes associated with 
migration.  In the regions of origin the rates of skill acquisition expand more markedly, as 
                                                 
34 As Pitchford (1974), indicates, technical change assumptions are important in this.  In our analysis the 
underlying changes in factor productivity are exogenous and constant across the base line, M1 and M2 
simulations.  This absence of interaction between migration and the productivity of individual factors (including 
production and professional labour) ensures that the standard implications of population growth for per capita 
income emerge. 
35 For some regions, particularly those where the labour force size effects of the expanded migration are small,  
the terms of trade effects are driven mainly by externally induced changes in trading prices.   23
shown in Table 8.  The most pronounced effects are in the poorest regions, where the skill 
premia were extremely high in 1997 (Figure 2).  For this reason, the wage of professional 
workers falls by most in the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It falls 
by more modest yet significant proportions in South America and in East and Southeast Asia, 
where this constitutes a reversal of the effects of pure skilled migration (M1).  That reversal is 
due to the dominance over skilled wage determination by the domestic skill transformation 
process, with its enhanced sensitivity to high domestic skill premia, rather than by emigration.  
The increased skill endowments further boost GDP in the destination regions.  This time, 
however, as Figure 9 shows, the change in skill composition in some regions of origin 
outweighs the effect of emigration and so also raises their GDP levels. 
  Returning to the declines in skill premia in the principal destination regions, the extent 
of this is, understandably, quite sensitive to the real wage divergence elasticity,  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε .  To 
minimise arbitrariness, we have shocked this elasticity to the same level (0.5) on all bilateral 
migration links.  Too large an increase in this elasticity (say to a value of unity) causes the 
collapse of skill premia, first in Australia, where the proportional effects of the migrations are 
largest.  The scale of the wage convergence embodied in the results shown in Figure 10 is 
further elucidated in Figure 11.  In Australia, the skill premium is reduced in proportion, 
though not in level, while in North America and Western Europe, it is merely stabilised in 
proportion.  Convergence of wage rates between regions, however, remains very modest, even 
with this substantial increase in skill migration flows (Table 11).  All this suggests that global 
labour markets offer scope for still further expansions in skilled migration.
36 
  Finally, the expanded skill-acquisition rates in M2 ensure that there are gains in real 
per capita income in all regions, relative to M1.  As Table 13 indicates, skill intensity effects 
are uniformly larger or less negative, while population expansion and terms of trade effects 
are little different.  Not surprisingly, these extra gains are largest in the Middle East and in 
Africa, where the initial skill premia are highest.  Small net losses continue to be incurred by 




  To investigate the effects of demographic changes on labour markets and the global 
distribution of economic growth, a new demographic sub-model is integrated with an 
                                                 
36 That there is scope for further expansion in skilled migration is also a conclusion by Hatton and Williamson 
(2005).   24
adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global economic model.  Skilled migration flows are 
assumed to be motivated by real wage differences to an extent that is variably constrained by 
immigration policies.  A uniform relaxation of these constraints on all inter-regional 
migration flows is found to have most effect on labour markets in the traditional migration 
destinations, Australia, Western Europe and North America, where it restrains the skill 
premium and substantially enhances GDP growth.  The skill premium is raised, however, in 
regions of origin, and particularly in South Asia, although the extent of this is shown to 
depend sensitively on the assumed responsiveness of skill acquisition to regional skill premia.  
In regions where skill premia are high at the outset, such as in North America, the Middle 
East and Africa, skill acquisition has a larger effect on regional wages than does migration. 
  The effects of expanded skilled migration on real per capita incomes depend on its 
implications for population sizes, labour force skill shares and the international terms of trade.  
As it turns out, these different effects tend to be off-setting in both regions of origin and 
destination, so that net changes in real per capita incomes are proportionally small. 
  Four important caveats must be borne in mind.  First, our base period matrices of 
migration flows leave room for improvement, since, given the paucity of standardised 
migration data, their construction depends on numerous assumptions.  New research on the 
documentation of migration stocks and flows will soon render some of those assumptions 
unnecessary.  Second, because our flow matrices are constructed from corresponding matrices 
of migrant stocks that are based originally on census data, there is no distinction between 
short- and long-stay migrants.  The migration matrices include both immigration and 
emigration flows for each region, however, so this is not an important demographic issue.  Its 
economic importance stems from the tendency for temporary migrants to remit incomes in a 
manner not accounted for in this study. 
Third, our model depends heavily on the GTAP global database, which takes 
incomplete account of inter-regional variations in the pricing of goods and services that are 
costly to trade.  Indeed, in the standard version of the model the levels of wages and of factor 
endowments do not need to be made explicit.  This means that inter-regional differences in 
factor productivity are imperfectly accounted for and PPP adjustments are needed in 
modelling the motive for migration.  We have blended the standard database with additional 
information about labour supplies and wage levels to make possible our analysis of increases 
in the responsiveness of migration flows to wage divergences.  In the long run, a more 
systemic solution to this problem is required.  Finally, although there is evidence to support it, 
we do not allow the fertility of professional households to depart from that of production   25
worker households.  Since a perception that skilled households have reduced fertility is an 
important aspect of the motivation for skill shortage claims, further research on the topic 
might better account for variations not only in fertility but also in other demographic 
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Figure 3: The Demographic Sub-Model 
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Figure 4: Base Line Changes in Global Population Distribution 
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Figure 11: Destination Region Wage Convergence in M2 




















































Table 1: Regional Composition 
 
Region  Composition of aggregates 
Australia  
North America  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Western Europe  European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but excluding 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union 
Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Japan  
China  Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Indonesia  
Other East Asia  Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
India  
Other South Asia  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Uruguay 
Middle East and Nth Africa  Includes Morocco through the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Sub-Saharan Africa  The rest of Africa 
Rest of World  Includes the rest of Central America, the rest of Indochina, the small 
Island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the 






Table 2: Ratio of Estimated Migrant Stocks to Recorded Annual Migration 
Flows in Australia, North America and Western Europe, 1997, % 
 
 Host  Region   
Sending Region  Australia  North America  Western Europe  Average 
Australia  0 10.43  7.12 8.78 
North America  4.51 0  10.05  7.28 
Western Europe  1.18 0.85  0  1.01 
Central Europe, FSU  1.57 2.19  6.26  3.34 
Japan  0.20 0.28  0.72  0.40 
China  5.46 4.54  5.63  5.21 
Indonesia  5.28 2.29  0.85  2.81 
Other East Asia  2.08 2.33  4.46  2.96 
India  4.50 4.63  4.31  4.48 
Other South Asia  4.09 8.93  1.19  4.74 
South America  3.21 2.11  0.44  1.92 
Mid East Nth Africa  2.52 1.82  1.51  1.95 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.39 5.07  1.89  4.45 
Rest of World  4.74 3.36  9.69  5.93 
Average  3.52 3.76  4.16   
Sources: - Parsons, C., R. Skeldon, T. Walmsley and A. Winters (2005), “Quantifying the international bilateral 
movements of migrants”, GTAP Technical Paper No. 1776, Purdue University. (www.gtap-
agecon.purdue.edu/resources); Migration Policy Institute (2004), “Global Data Center” The Migration 
Information Source, Washington. (http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData); DIMIA (2001), 
“Immigration Federation to Century’s End 1901-2000”. Statistics Section, Department of Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs.  41
Table 3: Estimated Annual Flow of Migrants by Sending and Host Region, ca 2000 
 



































































































































































































Australia  0 10000  13855  663  540  482  133  1273  70 644  232  974 810  6602  36278 
North America  3722  0  88730 10787 3429 3756  1629  15811 802 15878  8169 22553 10975  32592  218833 
Western Europe  20326  48139  0  6436 252 319  272  2497 134 3329  10212  9976 6780  4780  113452 
Central Europe, FSU  6000 60451  366672  0  194 4599  395 3755 701 22039  2530  92712  19285  2170  581503 
Japan  50 1500  800  2000 0 102  18  219 3  56  281 55  30  61 5175 
China  12689 100626 30000  50000 13190  0  5053 51354 1605  6276  2136  3552  3108  5855  285444 
Indonesia  2491 2000 2000 3000 410  1786 0 26229 28  726  34 11007 359  201 50271 
Other East Asia  10197 106723 50000  60000 19951  19456  4761  0  2603  5533  788  18520  2272  3858  304662 
India  4298 63103  34947 3139  259 3288  1293  11747  0  89424 232  182031  5956 2000  401717 
Other South Asia  3628 57050  13855 5288  781 5521  681 6673  283795 0  331  202180  5091 1269  586143 
South America  2000  47169  7382 1244  4427  1399 91 881  76 2130  0  2026 1231  2595  72651 
Mid East Nth Africa  5742 26979  114410  6679  142 1605  199 1815 1043 4934 1234  0  10258 680 175720 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9293  47669  50630  6031 196 287  221  2000  2032  10124  770  34191  0  2620  166064 
Rest of World  22303  245228  93851 50539 3030 6562 743 7195 11731  11710  5238 41138 46852  0  546120 
Total  102739 816637 867132 205806 46801 49162  15489  131449  304623  172803  32187 620915 113007 65283 3544033 
 
Sources: - Parsons, C., R. Skeldon, T. Walmsley and A. Winters (2005), “Quantifying the international bilateral movements of migrants”, GTAP Technical Paper 
No. 1776, Purdue University. (www.gtap-agecon.purdue.edu/resources); Migration Policy Institute (2004), “Global Data Center” The Migration 
Information Source, Washington. (http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData); DIMIA (2001), “Immigration Federation to Century’s End 1901-
2000”. Statistics Section, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; USCIS (2001), “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics”, Office of 
Immigration Statistics, US Citizenship and Immigration Services. (www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook).  42
Table 4: Wages per Worker at Market Exchange Rates (MER) and 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
a 
(US$ ‘000 / year) 
 
  Production workers  Professional workers 
  MER PPP MER PPP 
Australia  20.5 19.6 33.8 32.3 
North America  23.1 27.9 44.5 53.7 
Western Europe  19.5 16.7 29.5 25.3 
Central Europe, FSU  2.4 4.8 2.1 4.3 
Japan  32.4 23.3 43.3 31.1 
China  0.9 3.7 2.4 9.8 
Indonesia  0.7 2.3 1.0 3.3 
Other East Asia  2.5 7.9 5.5  17.5 
India  0.4 1.4 0.7 2.5 
Other South Asia  0.3 0.9 0.8 2.0 
South America  4.4 7.3  11.5  18.8 
Mid East Nth Africa  2.9 5.2  10.0  17.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.9 3.2  12.7  46.6 
Rest of World  3.1 3.3 6.2 6.6 
Mean  8.1 9.1  14.6  19.4 
Standard Deviation  10.8 8.9 16.1  16.6 
Coefficient of Variation  1.32 0.98 1.11 0.86 
a Wages, denominated in thousands of US dollars per worker, are values of firms’ purchases at agents’ prices. 
Sources: -GTAP Database; Liu, J. et al (1998), “Disaggregating Labour Payments by Skill Level in GTAP”. 
GTAP Technical Paper No. 11, Purdue University. (www.gtap-agecon.purdue.edu/resources); World 




Table 5: Base Line Projections of Labour Force Size and Structure 
 
 Labour  force
a  % Female  % 40+ 
  Initial 2030 Initial 2030 Initial 2030 
Australia  8  9  37 39 42 49 
North America  182  240  40 41 42 48 
Western Europe  184  166  40 44 47 55 
Central Europe  181  147  47 46 44 53 
Japan  61 55 37 37 58 65 
China  570  591  37 36 34 47 
Indonesia  88  129  38 38 40 54 
Other East Asia  127  179  41 40 37 51 
India  356  594  27 28 36 47 
Other South Asia  134  258  28 28 32 44 
South America  123  193  38 39 33 48 
Mid East Nth Afr  103  187  24 23 30 42 
Sub-Saharan Afr  150  350  28 29 29 36 
Rest of World  79  134  36 34 38 48 
a  Measured in full time equivalent workers. 
Source: Projection using the demographic model described in the text, as presented in detail by Chan and Tyers 
(2006).   43
 
 
Table 6: Base Line Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios 
 
Per cent  Non-working aged/working 
 Initial  2030 
Australia  35.1 55.5 
North America  24.1 37.0 
Western Europe  42.1 60.8 
Central Europe  28.8 42.4 
Japan  31.7 47.3 
China  18.8 44.4 
Indonesia  8.6 15.7 
Other East Asia  9.3 22.5 
India  12.1 22.9 
Other South Asia  9.0 17.5 
South America  15.9 28.6 
Mid East Nth Africa  14.8 33.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  12.7 15.3 
Rest of World  15.0 26.9 
Source: Base period statistics constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2003) and simulation 





Table 7:  Base Line Real GDP and per Capita Income Projections to 2030 
 
% change 2030 over 1997  Implied  average annual growth 
rate, %/yr 
 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Australia  265.21 178.25  4.00  3.15 
North America  243.57 169.65  3.81  3.05 
Western Europe  139.72 169.75  2.68  3.05 
Central Europe & FSU  212.03 221.26  3.51  3.60 
Japan  128.73 197.96  2.54  3.36 
China  468.75 321.39  5.41  4.46 
Indonesia  382.48 353.34  4.88  4.69 
Other East Asia  342.61 326.87  4.61  4.50 
India  611.67 280.14  6.13  4.13 
Other South Asia  291.56 103.06  4.22  2.17 
South America  170.93 117.02  3.07  2.38 
Mid East & Nth Africa  211.28 83.77  3.50  1.86 
Sub-Saharan Africa  274.20 93.65  4.08  2.02 
Rest of World  304.56 135.79  4.33  2.63 
Source: The base line projection described in the text.   44
 
 
Table 8:  Transformation (Skill Acquisition) Rates
a 
(Per cent of production worker household population 





Australia  0.12 0.175
North America  0.30 0.515
Western Europe  0.13 0.180
Central Europe  0.12 0.131
Japan  0.15 0.193
China  0.08 0.115
Indonesia  0.10 0.139
Other East Asia  0.11 0.165
India  0.08 0.095
Other South Asia  0.07 0.086
South America  0.10 0.164
Mid East Nth Africa  0.08 0.193
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.04 0.089
Rest of World  0.10 0.144
a  The proportion, ρ, in equation 11. 
Source: Economy-wide skill subdivisions from the ILO Yearbook, various issues, projections by Goujon and 






Table 9:  Skilled and Unskilled Labour Force, Baseline, M1 and M2 
  (Millions) 
  Baseline initial  Baseline 2030  M1 2030  M2 2030 
 Skilled  Unskilled Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
Australia  2 5 3 6 3 6  3  6 
North America  48  134  62  176  70  176 77 170 
Western Europe  57  127  52  115  56  115 57 114 
Central Europe  45  136  38  110  35  110 35 110 
Japan  19 42 18 38 18 38  18  37 
China  71  499  79  515  78  515 82 511 
Indonesia  9 78 14  115  14  115 14 114 
Other East Asia  20  107  29  149  28  149 30 147 
India  37  319  66  522  63  522 65 521 
Other South Asia  14  120  27  226  25  226 25 226 
South America  18  105  28  163  28  163 30 161 
Mid East Nth Afr  6 97 10  175  11  175 15 171 
Sub-Saharan Afr  4  147 8 335  8  335 11 332 
Rest of World  13  66 21  112  19  112 20 111 
Source: GTAP 5 Database, base period labour force estimates from Chan and Tyers (2006) and simulations 






Table 10: Changes in 2030 Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios
a 
 
Percentage points  2030 Non-working dependency ratio 
levels 
Percentage point departures 
from baseline 
 Baseline  M1 M2 M1 M2 
Australia  55.5 53.1 53.1  -2.4  -2.4 
North America  37.0 36.5 36.4  -0.6  -0.6 
Western Europe  60.8 59.4 59.4  -1.4  -1.4 
Central Europe  42.4 42.5 42.6  0.1  0.2 
Japan  47.3 46.9 46.9  -0.4  -0.4 
China  44.4 43.7 43.7  -0.7  -0.7 
Indonesia  15.7 15.6 15.6  -0.1  -0.1 
Other East Asia  22.5 22.3 22.3  -0.3  -0.3 
India  22.9 22.7 22.7  -0.2  -0.2 
Other South Asia  17.5 17.3 17.3  -0.2  -0.2 
South America  28.6 28.4 28.4  -0.2  -0.2 
Mid East Nth Africa  33.0 32.6 32.6  -0.4  -0.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  15.3 15.3 15.3  0.0  0.0 
Rest of World  26.9 26.7 26.7  -0.2  -0.2 
a  These are percentage point changes in the non-working aged dependency ratios listed in Table 6. 








Table 11:  Production (unskilled) and Professional (skilled) Wages, Baseline, M1 and M2 
   (US$  ‘000  per  year) 
  Baseline initial  Baseline 2030  M1 2030  M2 2030 
  Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled Unskilled Skilled  Unskilled Skilled  Unskilled 
Australia  33.8 20.5 92.0  58.5  82.2 61.6 80.9 62.1 
North America  44.5 23.1  109.0 56.3 102.9 58.1  96.7  60.5 
Western Europe  29.5 19.5 72.8  47.8  69.7 48.7 68.6 49.2 
Central Europe  2.6 2.2 8.1  7.3  8.6 7.2 8.5 7.2 
Japan  43.3 32.4  104.5 79.0 103.5 79.1 102.1 79.6 
China  2.4 0.9 8.9  3.7  8.9 3.7 8.6 3.7 
Indonesia  1.6 0.7 4.4  1.8  4.4 1.8 4.2 1.8 
Other East Asia  5.5 2.5  15.7 6.8 16.0 6.8 15.4 6.9 
India  0.7 0.4 1.8  1.1  1.9 1.1 1.8 1.1 
Other South Asia  0.8 0.3 1.3  0.6  1.4 0.6 1.4 0.6 
South America  11.5 4.4 20.1  7.4  20.2 7.4 19.2 7.5 
Mid East Nth Africa  20.1 2.8 34.4  4.6  32.3 4.7 26.7 5.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  12.7 0.9 20.5  1.4  20.9 1.4 17.1 1.5 
Rest of World  6.2 3.1  13.4 6.5 14.3 6.4 13.8 6.5 
      Source:  The base line columns are from Table 4 and the projections are constructed using the model described in the text.  47
 
 
Table 12:  Effects of Expanded Skilled Migration on 2030 Population, Skill Intensity, Terms of Trade and Real per 
Capita Income, M1 Relative to the Base Line
 
(% changes relative to the base line in 2030) 
 





a Physical  capital 
stock 
Terms of trade
b  Real per capita 
income 
Australia  7.11 -4.72 4.72 16.13 8.13 -1.03 -0.37 
North America  3.19 -2.21 2.21 9.29 5.16 -0.59 0.62 
Western Europe  2.43 -1.74 1.74 6.01 3.23 -0.12 0.18 
Central Europe  -2.17 1.76 -1.76 -6.96 -4.69 0.45  0.09 
Japan  0.49 -0.30 0.30 1.10 -1.21 0.84  0.40 
China  -0.21 0.23 -0.23 -1.45 -2.65 0.20  -0.33 
Indonesia  -0.14 0.17 -0.17 -1.28 -0.90 0.43  0.33 
Other East Asia  -0.48 0.45 -0.45 -2.60 -1.49 0.46  0.67 
India  -0.45 0.46 -0.46 -3.84 -1.83 0.47  -0.07 
Other South Asia  -1.03 1.02 -1.02 -9.48 -3.13 0.64  -0.19 
South America  -0.12 0.13 -0.13 -0.74 -1.40 0.47  0.09 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.45 -0.50 0.50 9.82 2.19 -0.09 1.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.07 0.09 -0.09 -3.03 -1.88 0.31  -0.41 
Rest of World  -1.55 1.35 -1.35 -8.75 -3.36 0.89  -0.03 
 
a  Skill intensity here refers to the share of the total labour force that is made up of professional workers. 
b  The quotient of regional export and import price indices. 




Table 13:  Effects of Expanded Skilled Migration on 2030 Population, Skill Intensity, Terms of Trade and Real per 
Capita Income, M2 Relative to the Base Line
 
(% changes relative to the base line in 2030) 
 





a Physical  capital 
stock 
Terms of trade
b  Real per capita 
income 
Australia  7.33 -5.42 5.42 18.45 7.81 -0.81 -0.30 
North America  3.38 -5.03 5.03 20.37 7.05 -0.73  1.86 
Western Europe  2.50 -2.45 2.45 8.39 2.93 0.03 0.48 
Central Europe  -2.21 1.64 -1.64 -6.45 -5.87 0.58  -0.03 
Japan  0.50 -0.91 0.91 3.05 -1.99 1.39  0.72 
China  -0.22 -0.40 0.40  3.45 -3.21 0.21  0.01 
Indonesia  -0.15 -0.56 0.56  5.82 -0.45 0.51  0.92 
Other East Asia  -0.51 -0.51 0.51  3.57 -1.04 0.54  1.50 
India  -0.48 0.21 -0.21 -1.59 -2.40 0.75  -0.03 
Other South Asia  -1.11 0.79 -0.79 -7.26 -3.35 0.78  0.03 
South America  -0.13 -0.99 0.99  7.14 0.38 0.58 1.15 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.52 -2.48 2.48 47.08 10.64 -1.12  5.55 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.08 -0.78 0.78 34.01 8.53 -0.53  5.07 
Rest of World  -1.62 0.61 -0.61 -3.86 -3.14 1.02  0.47 
 
a  Skill intensity here refers to the share of the total labour force that is made up of professional workers. 
b  The quotient of regional export and import price indices. 
   Source:  The  base  line  and  M2 projections described in the text. 